Abstract-Today, Internet of Things (IoT) technology is being increasingly popular which is applied in a wide range of industry sectors such as healthcare, transportation and some critical infrastructures. With the widespread applications of IoT technology, people's lives have changed dramatically. Due to its capabilities of sensitive data-aware, information collection, communication and processing, it raises security and privacy concerns. Moreover, a malicious attacker may impersonate a legitimate user, which may cause security threat and violation privacy. In allusion to the above problems, we propose a novel and lightweight anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous IoT, which is innovatively designed to shift between the public key infrastructure (PKI) and certificateless cryptography (CLC) environment. The proposed scheme not only achieves secure communication among the legal authorized users, but also possesses more attributes with user anonymity, non-repudiation and key agreement fairness. Through the security analysis, it is proved that the proposed scheme can resist replay attacks and denial of service (DOS) attacks. Finally, the performance evaluation demonstrates that our scheme is more lightweight and innovative.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of modern smart technologies, Internet of things (IoT) has caught much attention from industry and IT community in terms of networking and communication aspects [1] . In the future, IoT communication scenarios will be a combination of heterogeneous access technologies and services, which enables users to be exposed to a diverse network environment. The heterogeneity of IoT determines that information can flow among multiple transmission networks with different structures, providing various services on a common network platform. Heterogeneous IoT can better adapt to the diversity of the IoT environment and realize the secure communication between users in different communication environments. Like in all other communication and computer networks, security issues are always significantly important in the development of heterogeneous IoT (HIoT). In addition, key agreement and authentication mechanism play indispensable roles in the aspects of protecting user privacy and data security for HIoT scenario.
IoT is a popular notion that has been widely used in industries such as healthcare and some critical infrastructures, as shown in Fig. 1 . Meanwhile, the diversity of IoT applications [2, 3] , exposing some threats of malicious attacks, data interception, user privacy leaking, unauthorized access, etc. These security flaws seriously affect HIoT's development and application. Therefore, security and privacy become essential in HIoT.
In 2010, the EU Commission identified security and privacy as a major IoT research challenge. Many research [4] [5] [6] [7] focused on secure communication and privacy preservation for HIoT. Moreover, some other research [8] [9] [10] [11] put forward countermeasures that were targeted at specific types of attacks. In [9] , a lightweight defensive algorithm for distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) was proposed for IoT environment, which could protect the sensor nodes from the attacks of malicious requests effectively. In order to preserve user privacy, Kim-Kim's scheme [10] adopted the one-time pseudonym identities synchronization mechanism that could maintain identities consistency between users and the server. However, the scheme was vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack. In 2015, Wang et al. [11] improved the Kim-Kim's scheme, achieving superior privacy preservation.
Authentication and key agreement are the core technologies 978-1-5386-8088-9/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE and the foundation of other security mechanisms. They enable legal authorized users to establish a reliable relationship between each other in HIoT. In 2009, a key establishment and authentication scheme based on combined public key (CPK) algorithm was proposed for the heterogeneous network, and it was proved to be efficient in terms of the mutual authentication [12] . In 2013, Chu et al. [13] proposed an identity authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptographic (ECC), which innovatively used the encryption algorithm of public-private key pair to satisfy the security requirements of heterogeneous network. In 2016, Amin et al. [14] came up with a three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme for IoT and claimed that their scheme was secure. However, Arasteh et al. [15] showed that the scheme of Amin et al. was prone to replay attacks and DOS attacks [16] . Moreover, due to the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices, the secure schemes should be lightweight. In allusion to this requirement, some schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] were proposed to reduce the computation burden of participants. In [21] , a secure and lightweight mutual authentication and key agreement scheme was presented, in which the cryptographic functions were proved to be computationally lightweight and resist some known attacks. Although these schemes were lightweight in the IoT environment, they did not prove that they were applicable to heterogeneous IoT. In [22] , Hou et al. proposed a secure and lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme based on CPK and ECC in HIoT environment. Unfortunately, this scheme used signature-toencryption in a time-consuming way. The schemes [23] [24] [25] satisfied the users distributed between PKI and identity-based cryptography (IBC) or between IBC and CLC. However, up to now, there is no one scheme in the environment of PKI and CLC.
In this paper, we propose a novel and lightweight anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous IoT, which is based on a lightweight signcryption algorithm between PKI and CLC environment. It provides more features of user anonymity, non-repudiation, key agreement fairness and lightweight. In addition, our scheme can be proved to resist replay attacks and DOS attacks. Therefore, it has wider application prospect in HIoT environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the secure HIoT's system model. Section III demonstrates the proposed mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for HIoT. Sections IV and V present informal security and performance analysis respectively. At last, the conclusion is described in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, there is a brief description of the HIoT's system model and security assumptions.
A. System model
A typical scenario model of HIoT is illustrated in Fig. 2 . It mainly consists of a gateway node (GWN), a user and a sensor node (SN).
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B. Security assumptions
The security of the proposed scheme depends on the hardness of the following problems:
G 1 is a cyclic additive group, and G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group. A large prime q is the order of
P is a generator of G 1 and g = e(P, P ).
Definition 1 (CDHP).
Defining Computational DiffieHellman Problem (CDHP) is to compute abP ∈ G 1 when given (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G 1 .
Definition 2 (ECDLP).
Defining Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is to compute the integer a ∈ Z * q when given (P, aP ) ∈ G 1 .
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a novel anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme based on a signcryption algorithm for HIoT, as shown in Fig. 3 . The proposed scheme comprises three phases: system initialization, system registration, system authentication and key agreement phase.
A. System initialization phase.
1) The GWN selects the main private key s ∈ Z * q randomly, and calculates the public key P pub = sP . Let l be the security parameter of the system and ID = {0, 1}
* be an identity space.
2) The GWN defines five secure cryptographic hash functions:
Then, it publishes parameter{G 1 , G 2 , P, P pub , l, g, H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } and keeps s.
B. System registration phase.
This phase is divided into two steps: registration between the user and the GWN, registration between the SN and the GWN.
Step 1: Registration between the user in PKI environment and the GWN.
1) The user runs PKI-Key-Gen algorithm:
• Select x p ∈ Z * q randomly as the private key sk p = x p ; • Compute P pub = x p P as its public key;
• Send the message {ID p , P K p } to the GWN through a secure channel. 2) The GWN firstly computes the account information Acd = (w 1 +H 0 (ID p ))P and the signature information σ 1 = w 1 +H 0 (ID p )+sδ, where w 1 ∈ Z * q and δ = H 1 (ID p , P K p ). Then, it returns the identity account management information {Acd, σ 1 , δ} to the user.
3) The user checks if the equation Acd = σ 1 P − P pub δ holds or not.
• If it holds, the user stores {Acd, σ 1 , δ}, and regards Acd as its identifier, which indicates the registration between the GWN and the user is successful; • Otherwise, the user aborts.
Step 2: Registration between the SN in CLC environment and the GWN.
1) The SN sends its identity ID c to the GWN.
2) The GWN runs CLC-Partial-Private-Key-Gene algorithm:
• Select t ∈ Z * q randomly, compute T = tP , γ = H 1 (ID c , T ) and obtain part of the private key d = t+sγ;
• Return {T, d, γ} to the SN through a secure channel.
3) The SN checks if e(dP, P ) = e(T, P )e(P pub , γP ) holds or not.
• If it holds, the GWN is legal. Then, the SN selects x c ∈ Z * q and obtains the intact privacy key sk c = {x c , d}; • Otherwise, the SN aborts. 4) The SN computes P K c1 = x c P and sets P K c = {T, P K c1 , γ} as its intact public key. Then, it checks if Acd = σ 1 P − P pub δ.
• If it holds, the SN stores {Acd, σ 1 , P K p , δ}, and regards Acd as legal user's identifier; • Otherwise, the SN aborts.
C. System authentication and key agreement phase.
1) The user runs the PKI-to-CLC heterogeneous signcryption algorithm:
• Select a random number k ∈ {0, 1} n ;
• Obtain the ciphertext message σ = {c, R 1 , r 1 , r 2 , U };
• Calculate the account protection information R 2 = R 1 + Acd; • Send a service request message {R 2 , σ, t c } to the SN.
2) Then, the SN runs the PKI-to-CLC heterogeneous unsigncryption algorithm:
• Check if |t c −t 1 | < ∆t, where t 1 is the current timestamp, and ∆t is the allowed transmission delay. If it holds, the message is fresh. The SN can carry on the subsequent steps. Otherwise, it terminates the authentication. If mutual authentication is successful, the user and the SN could generate the same session key respectively. Therefore, they can communicate with each other securely in the future.
IV. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS
Due to the limitation of space, this paper only explains the security of the protocol through informal security analysis.
A. Mutual authentication
The scheme realizes mutual heterogeneous authentication between SNs and users. When a user starts the authentication phase with a SN, the SN has to verify the identity of the user. Thereby, it needs to verify the user's legality by running the authentication phase of Section III. After verifying user's legality, the user starts authenticating the SN. The user can also verify the SN's legality by running the authentication phase of Section III. When the SN and the user are both proven to be legal, they also have completed the key agreement phase.
B. Key agreement
Only the user and the SN can get the session key key = H 2 (h 1 , R 1 ). The user does not send the account information Acd to the SN directly. Acd is hidden in the account protection information R 2 = R 1 + Acd. If the private key of the SN is unavailable, anyone else can not obtain Acd and h 1 . In other word, it is impossible for others to get the session key. Therefore, the session key is secure in our scheme.
C. Anonymity
Our scheme ensures the user's anonymity via the masked identity {ID p , P K p }. In system registration phase, the user sends the registration request message {ID p , P K p } to the GWN. The GWN creates an account information Acd for the user. Here, Acd is not the real identity of the user. Namely, it is only the user's identifier. When the user sends a service request message to the SN, the SN sends the corresponding service to the user with Acd, but it does not know the real identity of the user. Because the SN can not derive the user's identity information from Acd. So our scheme achieves the user's identity anonymity in system registration phase.
In system authentication phase, Acd is not transmitted in plaintext and is hidden by the account protection information R 2 = R 1 + Acd. Only the user and the SN can get Acd. Even the GWN can not get the user's real identity. Therefore, our scheme can provide the user's identity anonymity.
D. Non-repudiation
The user sends the service request message {R 2 , σ, t c } to the SN, but in this process others can not forge the ciphertext message σ without obtaining the user's intact private key due to the hardness of the CDHP problem under current conditions. Thereby, σ can only be generated by the user. When the authentication is successful, the SN will provide the corresponding services for the legal user. The user can not deny sending the service request messages to the SN. Similarly, anyone else is unable to impersonate the SN due to the lack of the SN's private key. Therefore, the SN can not deny either that it had received the user's service request messages or that it had provided the corresponding services for the user.
E. Key agreement fairness
The SN calculates the session key key = H 2 (h 1 , R 1 ) and the message authentication code M 1 . Then it sends M 1 to the user. After receiving M 1 , the user calculates the message digest h 1 = H 1 (ID c ||t c , Acd||c) in order to get the session key key = H 2 (h 1 , R 1 ). It computes the message authentication code M * 1 . The SN and the user can get the session key and the message authentication code equally, and one participant does not have more privilege than the other. Therefore, the communication participants are in an equal position after the key agreement is completed. According to the above, fairness is ensured in our scheme.
F. Anti-replay attacks
The SN is unable to identify the validity of the message from the user, because it does not know if the message had been received by itself. The attackers usually utilize the drawback to initiate a replay attack on the SN. Our scheme avoids this drawback by involving a timestamp to the user's service request message effectively. After receiving the service request message, the SN can check the freshness of the message based on the judgment of the timestamp to identify if the message could be accepted. Therefore, our scheme can resist replay attacks.
G. Denial of service attacks
In system registration phase, the GWN sends the account information Acd to the user and the SN respectively through a secure channel. When the user initiates a service request for the SN, the SN utilizes the account protection information R 2 and own private key to compute Acd. Then, it verifies if Acd is equal to the received Acd, so as to determine if it should accept the service request message from the user. Before generating a bogus service request, the attackers must calculate Acd correctly ahead. However, they can not get the correct Acd = (w 1 + H 0 (ID p ))P without the random number w 1 . Our scheme exploits Acd to prevent attackers from abusing system resources to send a lot of invalid service request messages. Therefore, our scheme can resist denial of service attacks successfully.
V. THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
For quantitative analysis of our scheme, we use Ubuntu OS as the experimental platform to simulate the total running time. In order to ensure the accuracy of data, the virtual machine runs several times to take the average computation costs. Let P denote the bilinear pairing operation, M denote the point multiplication operation in G 1 , E denote the exponential operation in G 2 , and H denote the hash operation separately.
TABLE I demonstrates the performance comparison between the proposed scheme and other related schemes. Note that SC denotes symmetric cryptography. It is assumed that, |G 1 | = 160bits, |G 2 | = 1024bits, |P | = 160bits, |H| = 160bits and |M | = 160bits. Fig. 4 shows the total computation and communication costs of each scheme.
From TABLE I, we can clearly find that the scheme [7] does not involve signcryption algorithm, so it causes higher communication costs. Although the scheme [25] has a lower communication overhead, it is inefficient with higher computation complexity. Furthermore, the scheme in [26] has only proved that it satisfies confidentiality and unforgeability. Besides, it has the key escrow issue, causing a lot of storage space to be occupied for the resource-constrained sensor node side. For all above, our scheme is more applicable for heterogeneous IoT.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent time, the security and privacy issues of HIoT have drawn much attention from all walks of life. In order to solve these problems for HIoT, this paper proposes an anonymous mutual authentication and key agreement scheme based on a proper signcryption algorithm. The proposed scheme not only possesses the features of anonymity, non-repudiation, key agreement fairness, but also can resist replay attacks and DOS attacks. Additionally, the scheme is highly lightweight with lower computation and communication overhead. What's more, it is innovatively designed to shift between the PKI and CLC environment. As a consequence, our scheme has a better scalability to be more applicable for heterogeneous IoT. 
